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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cambodia's mine and ERW problem is a result of the long period of civil and regional conflicts
that affected the country from the late 60s until 1998. Due to these conflicts, Cambodia is now
one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world, with more than 63,000 mine/ERW
victims recorded since 1979.
The first efforts to address Cambodia’s massive mine/ERW contamination came from the UN
Advance Mission for Cambodia (UNAMIC), which contracted the HALO Trust in 1991-1992 to
survey 700 km² of land in Battambang province ahead of the probable repatriation of 360,000
Cambodian refugees based in Thailand. In March 1992, the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), deployed in February of that year, took over UNAMIC’s mission and
functions, including assisting mine clearance and mine awareness activities. So in July 1992,
UNTAC set up the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) and started to teach Cambodian
nationals to identify, locate and destroy landmines, and to mark minefields.
Meanwhile, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was also created in 1992, with a
mandate to conduct mine clearance and mine risk education, including by coordination with
international NGO operators such as Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group (MAG),
HALO, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), all of which started mine clearance operations in the
northwest of the country that same year. After UNTAC’s withdrawal in August 1993, UNDP and
UNOPS started to provide technical and financial support to CMAC through a UN Trust Fund for
Demining in Cambodia.
By the time it formally adopted its first national strategic plan in 1995, CMAC had become an
efficient, autonomous organisation whose coordination role encouraged healthy competition
between operators and a high level of cooperation between all organisations involved in mine
action. Nevertheless, despite the high degree of national ownership of the mine action
programme, CMAC’s management model—the organisation played the role of both a mine
action centre and a mine action authority—proved to be too ‘bulky’ and unmanageable.
Unsurprisingly, in 1999, several allegations of corruption, mismanagement and nepotism
surfaced. As a result, a large number of CMAC managers and staff were demoted, moved to
other positions or simply resigned. In addition, donor confidence was dramatically affected and
most donors halted or diminished their financial support, waiting for the organisation’s reform.
The 1999 crisis forced the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to seek means of regaining
regain the confidence of donors. This was done by engaging in a very structured and robust
reform of CMAC, which significantly enhanced its operational capacity and productivity, and
significantly improved the quality of its management. The organization slimmed down the
headquarter structure with only three departments and reorganized the operations to gain in
flexibility and responsiveness. In addition, the RGC also restructured the institutional framework
of the entire mine action sector in Cambodia by creating the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim
Assistance Authority (CMAA) as an entity completely separate from CMAC.
The establishment of CMAA, as a both a coordinating body for all mine action activities and a
regulator on behalf of the RGC, consolidated national ownership by giving the RGC the capacity
to lead the mine action programme according to its priorities and strategies, and to regain

donor confidence. However, despite the high level of national ownership, there are still a
number of projects supported by different development partners, which are independently
managed and implemented, including projects on MRE, demining, and integrated demining and
development projects.

INTRODUCTION
In 1953, Cambodia gained independence from France, and Prime Minister Sihanouk
ruled for the following 15 years. In March 1970, he was deposed by Lon Nol, who went
on to become the President of the new Khmer Republic in 1972. Despite massive
support from the United States and a colossal bombing campaign, Phnom Penh fell to
the communist Khmer Rouge regime in April 1975, under which an estimated 1.5 million
Cambodians died; from execution, starvation or disease.
In December 1978, Vietnam launched a full scale invasion of Cambodia and, on 1 July
1979, took control of Phnom Penh, and installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK).
Sihanouk then established the 'Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant,
Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif' (FUNCINPEC) and its armed wing the 'Armée Nationale
Sihanoukiste' (ANS). The 'Khmer People's National Liberation Front' (KPNLF) of Son
Sann joined forces with the Khmer Rouge and the ANS, uniting against the Vietnamese
occupation. Despite the presence of a large Vietnamese military contingent (140,000)
supporting Government forces, insurgent troops could not be defeated. The civil conflict
lasted ten years, until Vietnam withdrew its military contingent in 1989. Peace efforts
intensified until the Paris Peace Agreement was signed on 23 October 1991.
The Khmer Rouge started to defect to the government in 1996, but despite this, the
Government remained unstable due to the political rivalries between the two Prime
Ministers. An explosive battle erupted in the streets of Phnom Penh in July 1997,
resulting in a large number of casualties and executions. In 1998, Pol Pot died, and the
remaining Khmer Rouge leaders defected to the government in December. This
indicated the end of more than 30 years of armed conflict in Cambodia.
Cambodia's landmine problem is the result of the long period of civil and regional
conflicts mentioned above, that affected the country from the late sixties until the end
of 1998.
Cambodia is one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world: a total of
63,704 victims of landmines1 and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were recorded
between 1979 and June 2010, with 184 casualties recorded in 20102.
Landmine victims represent 80 per cent of the total (50,306) and ERW victims 20 per
1

The definitions of terms as 'mines', 'landmines', 'ERW', 'demining', 'humanitarian demining', 'clearance', 'mine
action', 'mine action organisation', 'risk education', 'mine victim', 'victim assistance', etc.. refer to the definitions
proposed by the International Mine Action Standards - IMAS 04.1.(Ed. 2), Amendments 1, 2, 3 & 4, 'Glossary of Terms
and Definitions'. The term 'landmine' will generally embrace both landmines and ERW except when the distinction is
important.
2
Cambodian Mine/ERW Victim Information System, August 2010.

1

cent (13,398), with 62 per cent of the casualties civilians. The number of victims has
decreased over the years, from 4,320 in 1996 to 244 in 2009, however Cambodia still
remains one of the most mine/ERW-affected countries in the world.
The national Level One Survey (L1S) was completed in April 2002, and reported that 46
per cent of all Cambodian villages were affected by landmines and/or ERW.
Contamination was suspected in all of the 24 provinces and was estimated to affect
4,544 km², or 2.5 per cent of the country landmass. The survey indicated that 20 per
cent of all Cambodian villages reported an 'adverse' socio-economic impact, preventing
access to housing, agriculture, pasture, water and forest resources.
Most landmine accidents occur in the northwest of Cambodia, where the conflicts were
most intense3. The most landmine-affected provinces are those located along the Thai–
Cambodian border: Battambang, Bantey Meanchey, Pailin, Oddar Meanchey and Preah
Vihear. The border area is reportedly heavily mined (known as the 'K5 mine belt'), with
an estimate of 2,400 landmines per kilometre along the 1,000 km borderline between
the countries, making it of the most heavily contaminated areas in the world.
Landmines, however, are not the only hazard impacting millions of Cambodians. During
the Vietnam War, United States war planes dropped 2.75 million bombs over the
country, mostly in the central and eastern provinces. The protracted nature of the
Cambodian civilian conflict also left millions of ERW scattered through the country.
A large part of those unexploded ordnances (UXO) still represent a lethal threat to
neighbouring communities and people foraging in forested areas. Landmine victims
used to largely exceed the number of ERW casualties4 (2,603 versus 730 in 1995), this
trend turned around in 2001, and since then, ERW victims consistently surpass the
number of landmine victims (133 versus 111 in 2009).
Figure: Evolution of the number of Landmine and ERW victims until 2009

3
4

See in Annex 4: The map of ERW/Mines accidents locations from January 2005 to June 2010
At the exception of 1997.

2

Despite massive efforts by all the mine action organisations that have been operating in
the country for 18 years, Cambodian authorities reported that landmines and ERW
continue to negatively affect the country, by5:
 Putting pressure on Cambodia's already fragile healthcare system
 Causing psychological trauma for communities forced to live alongside such a
threat
 Blocking access to potentially productive land
 Weakening livelihood options such as raising cattle and foraging in forested
areas
 Restricting access to safe drinking water
 Placing emotional and financial hardship on families caring for mine victims
 Preventing access to infrastructures, services and markets
 Diverting funds for clearance from other crucial sectors, such as education and
health
 Weakening Cambodia international reputation by contributing to missed
opportunities for the country and its citizens in terms of tourism and trade
 Increasing food insecurity

5

National Mine Action Strategy 2010 – 2019.
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

1992-1997: THE INCEPTION PHASE OF THE MINE ACTION
PROGRAMME

In November 1991, the UN Advance Mission for Cambodia (UNAMIC) was deployed to
maintain the ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment of the UNTAC, and
to initiate mine awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was
enlarged to include training in mine clearance and the initiation of a mine clearance
programme6. The first efforts to assess the scope of the landmine problem in Cambodia
were conducted by the UNHCR, which had contracted The HALO Trust (HALO) in 19911992 to survey 700 km² of land in Battambang province, in prevision of the repatriation
of the 360,000 Cambodian refugees based in Thailand7. The result of this survey showed
the following:
• 112 km² - 'heavily mined'
• 280 km² - 'probably mined'
• 308 km² - 'probably clear of mines'8

UNAMIC’s mission and functions were taken over by UNTAC in March 1992.
Consequently, one of the four responsibilities of the UNTAC military component
consisted in assisting mine clearance and awareness activities. In July 1992, UNTAC set
up the mine clearance training unit (MCTU), which started to teach Cambodian
nationals to identify, locate and destroy landmines, and to mark minefields. MCTU also
promoted mine awareness among the general public9.
However, MCTU activities were undermined by the absence of a general strategy that
would have prepared for the continuation of mine action activities after the
organisation's departure. In addition, no arrangements were made to develop the

6

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 728 was adopted 8/1/1992. After recalling resolutions 668 (1990),
717 (1991) and 718 (1991), the Council welcomed the implementation by all parties of the agreement in Paris on
October 23, 1991, but expressed concern at the existence of landmines in Cambodia. The Council noted the
establishment of a mine-awareness programme by a report of the Secretary-General in Resolution 717, and that the
agreements allow the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia to assist in the process of demining and to
undertake training programmes. It also requested the Supreme National Council of Cambodia to co-operate with the
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia with its expanded mandate of demining and training the local
population, and again called upon all parties to observe the ceasefire.
7
A majority of the Cambodian refugees intended to resettle in Battambang province as well as in other mine-affected
areas in the northwest of the country.
8
Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, August 2009.
9
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html
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technical and management skills necessary to run a large mine action programme10.
The Supreme National Council (SNC) decided to create the Cambodian Mine Action
Centre (CMAC) in June 1992. The Governing Council of the organisation, composed of
representatives from the SNC Presidency and from the office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), met for the first time in November of
the same year. Aware of the eventual UNTAC withdrawal, different practical solutions
were found to make the deminers trained by MCTU operational. Handicap International
Belgium (HIB), for example, temporarily employed MCTU graduates to field the
country’s first deminers.
Other demining operators such as HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian
People's Aid (NPA) also started mine clearance operations in the northwest of the
country. The French semi-official agency COFRAS-CIDEV started demining in 1993 in
Siem Reap, and other organisations, such as the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and World
Vision (WV), got involved in mine risk education (MRE). Organisations such as HI, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Veteran International (VI)
supported the provision of rehabilitation services to mine victims and people with
disabilities.
After UNTAC withdrew in August 1993, UNDP began providing technical support to
CMAC, a UN trust fund for Demining in Cambodia. The UN Security Council (UNSC)
requested the use of its resources to assist CMAC. The first UNDP/UNOPS project for
financial and technical assistance began at the end of 1993 ('Assistance to Demining
Programmes - CMB/93/A07').
CMAC became an autonomous public institution in 1995, with the mandate to conduct
mine clearance and MRE operations; that year, the organisation developed its first
strategic plan11. In late 1996, CMAC took responsibility for accrediting new mine action
agencies and started to request 'independent' mine action operators to submit their
workplans to reinforce coordination12.
In 1997, the general perception about the organisation was very positive13; CMAC’s
coordination role was strongly established and the relationship with other mine action
organisations was based on trust and mutual respect14. Competition between
'independent' operators and CMAC was considered healthy and a high degree of
10

Eaton R., Horwood C., Niland N., 'Cambodia: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacity', United Nations
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1998.
11
CMAC, 'Clearing the Path Ahead: 1996-2000'.
12
GICHD, 'A Study of Capacity Development in Mine Action, Case study of Cambodia', Paterson T. with Vanna M.,
September 2004.
13
'CMAC enjoyed international confidence and funding from many donor countries for its operations and had
become one of the world's most successful mine action programme by 1997', UNDP, Mine Action project CMB98006,
Terminal Evaluation Mission 2001, Dalton M., Bou Puthy, Ayrine Uk, David Edwards.
14
Eaton et al, Cambodia, 1998
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cooperation and unity among the different organisations was reported.
1998-2000: A TURNING POINT – “WHAT DOES KILL YOU MAKES YOU
STRONG” 15

Rather than separating the regulation, coordination and implementation roles, CMAC
became the largest mine action operator in Cambodia, playing the role of a mine action
centre, with the organisation’s governing council acting as a mine action authority. In
addition, CMAC represented Cambodia in the international mine action fora.
At the beginning of 1999, several disturbing issues surfaced and were widely reported in
the media. It first appeared that CMAC had to bribe officials from the Ministry of
Economy and Finances to receive the Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) financial
contribution to the programme. It also emerged that CMAC was unable to account for
large areas of land supposedly cleared: a May 1999 internal memorandum concluded
that 'CMAC did not know with any clarity, completeness or accuracy in which minefields
it conducted operations in 1998'. Instead of clearing land for the poor, some of the
cleared land was 'sold' for profit rather than handed over to provincial authorities.
Following these corruption and mismanagement allegations, an audit conducted by
KPMG concluded that 'the performance of the financial, management and operational
activities was seriously deficient'. In the audit report, the human resources department
was accused of 'nepotism within CMAC', pointing to an extensive list of the relatives of
CMAC managers who had been appointed within the organisation.
Under donor pressure, CMAC Director General Sam Sotha was removed from his
position in August and was replaced by General Khem Sophoan. A large number of
CMAC managers and staff had been demoted, moved to other positions or had simply
resigned. The UNDP Programme Coordinator also quit his position. Donor confidence
was dramatically affected and most halted or slowed down their financial support and
disbursements, waiting for the organisation to undergo a deep reform process. Many
donors also chose to stop channelling their funding through the UNDP trust fund.
The limited availability of funds meant that, by late 1999, CMAC was in a critical
situation. The establishment of a 'regulatory body' attached to the CMAC Governing
Council was proposed, to create a regulatory function outside the CMAC headquarters,
in order to conform to the national legislation for the time being. Then, in early
September 2000, the RGC announced the creation of the Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA). The new structure appeared to be precisely in line
15

A good understanding of the CMAC 'scandal' and the reasons that caused it is essential to fully apprehend the
history of the program in Cambodia and appreciate the reforms implemented during the decade that followed. A
timeline of the mine action programme and a more detailed description of the problems encountered by the
organisation during this crucial period is in Annex 6 together with sources and references
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with the best recognised international practices of separating the regulator from the
service providers; as recommended by the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS)16. However, the decision to set up this new agency had not been discussed with
the donors, and the appointment of Sam Sotha as Secretary General of the new
structure was received with disappointment by development partners and mine action
experts.
CMAC sustained problems, and difficult relations with donors prompted the RGC to hold
a national symposium on mine action in mid-November 2000. The objective of the
meeting was to dissipate mistrust and enhance national and international partnerships
under the principles of greater national ownership and leadership. The meeting
provided an opportunity for the RGC to clarify the role of the newly established CMAA
as well as the future of CMAC. The symposium contributed to the restoration of
confidence between the RGC and the donor community, which did not wish to see
CMAC totally collapsing. Many donors resumed their support to a downsized CMAC.
The organisation reduced the headquarters to only three departments, and reorganised
operations to be more flexible and responsive. A new field structure was adopted, with
six regional demining units and one training centre.
2001-2012: TOWARD INCREASED NATIONAL OWNERSHIP,
LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING

A streamlined and reformed CMAC remarkably survived this turbulent period, and
emerged as a better managed and more productive organisation than before the crisis.
A new, clearer mine action programme structure was in place, leading to increased
efficiency and productivity of mine action activities, and in particular, for clearance
operations.
The results of the crisis were generally considered beneficial for Cambodia: the RGC
took a more firm lead in conducting the programme, resulting in increased ownership
and leadership in the sector. The modes of assistance to the CMAC and to the sector in
general had been reviewed, resulting in a smaller but more adapted technical assistance
component (see paragraph 3.2. on technical assistance).
With the cessation of armed hostilities in the country, and following the Mine Ban
Treaty (MBT) ratification, national authorities recognised the need to shift from an
emergency approach to a longer term development perspective. Consequently, this
generated a more precise mapping of the threat, which was essential for planning
16

Following the CMAA setting up, CMAC mandate was amended with a new Royal Decree. The 1999 national
legislation against landmines remained however unchanged. In a comment dated 12/4/2010 following a capacity
assessment conducted in the CMAA, the organisation announced that 'the CMAA shared the findings on this aspect
and has a firm commitment to define a clear mandate. CMAA will commission a review of the entire legal framework
for mine action and will propose requisite legislation and amendments to realise the above commitment'
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purposes, and for measuring mine action performance.
Canada and the RGC decided to launch a 'Level 1 Survey' (L1S) project, to be
implemented by GeoSpatial International (GSI), in cooperation with CMAC. The
objective was to document the full scope and impact of the landmine and ERW
problem.
Directly funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the project
began in mid-2000 and finished in April 2002. Survey teams visited the 13,910
Cambodian villages17, and reported that 6,416 of them (46.1 per cent) were affected by
landmines and/or ERW18. The survey also found that 4,544 km² of land was suspected to
be affected. The RGC considered the L1S suspected hazardous areas (SHA) to present
the first national overview of the extent and location of Cambodia's mine and ERW
contamination. The survey was certified by the UN certification committee, and was
overseen by an external quality assurance monitor (QAM)19.
Since completion of the project in 2002, and with subsequent experience gained by
operators, the L1S results are no longer considered accurate,20 and the RGC and CMAA
decided to implement a baseline survey (BLS) to provide more detailed information on
the exact extent of the remaining contamination in Cambodia (see paragraph 2.3.7. on
Survey and Area Reduction Policy).
Despite symbolising Cambodian ownership in the mine action sector21, the CMAA’s
early years were difficult, as donors provided only modest support to the organisation,
partly because of their distrust of the Secretary-General. In addition, the RGC never met
its annual funding commitment to the new agency22. As a result, essential functions
were not adequately executed, such as:
•
•
•
•

overall coordination and control
strategic planning
information management
quality management

A joint evaluation conducted in 2004 for the donor working group on mine action
17

Except three of them
See in Annex 4: Map of the L1S hazards
19
Cambodia National Level One Survey, Final Report, GeoSpatial International Inc, 2002
20
The L1S follows the principles of the standard landmines impact survey (LIS) methodology developed by the Survey
Action Centre (SAC) The purpose of the L1S was mostly to document the negative impact of landmines and ERW
contamination on affected communities and not to determine with precision the size of those hazards neither to
define the shape of the SHA (polygons)
21
'The CMAA was established to provide holistic national leadership to the sector and to symbolize Cambodia
ownership of the problem that had up until then been largely managed by international community'. Article 5
extension request
22
Paterson and Vanna, 2004
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concluded that the CMAA was 'weak and ineffective'23. The report confirmed the lack of
confidence in the organisation’s Secretary-General and, as result, CMAA work was
largely ignored. Another study on capacity development noted that CMAA
performances had been lacking in enthusiasm24.
Of a mine action centre’s responsibilities, coordination is one of the easiest and
cheapest, but nonetheless, the CMAA did not deliver satisfactory results in this function.
For example, the CMAA took over the organisation of monthly coordination meetings
that had been previously hosted by the governing council25, and which involved all
stakeholders and even donors. However, meetings were not regularly organised, were
called with minimal notice, and provided little opportunity for open discussion. The view
expressed by the operators was that these coordination meetings were for the most
part, worthless. Coordination meetings with donors through the Mine Action Advisory
Board (MAAB), replacing the former CMAC Steering Committee, also took place
infrequently26.
However, despite existing difficulties, and thanks to external assistance from several
donors and development organisations, the CMAA gradually became more operational
and produced a national mine action strategy, and, in August 2003, finalised a five-year
mine action plan. The Land Use Planning Units (LUPU) system was preserved and even
enlarged to new provinces (see paragraph 2.2. on planning).
In parallel, with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000, international
attention increasingly focused on the importance of both aid volume and effectiveness.
In December 2004, the RGC issued a formal declaration on 'development cooperation
partnerships to enhance aid-effectiveness' and the mine action sector adopted the
coordination and harmonisation mechanisms developed by the RGC; the Cambodian
Rehabilitation Development Board (CRDB) and the Council for Development of
Cambodia (CDC).
In October 2008, a new Royal Decree27 was issued, and Sam Sotha was replaced as
CMAA Secretary General and Ambassador in charge of landmine issues a few weeks
later, by Chum Bun Rong.28
23

Griffin R., Keeley R., Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action,
December 2004
24
Paterson and Vanna, 2004. Participants to those meetings reported that they constituted a 'one way
communication' from the CMAA Secretary-General rather than an opportunity for open discussions
25
The meetings were called the 'Cambodian Demining Coordination Committee' (CDCC)
26
Paterson and Vanna, 2004
27
Royal Decree 1008/1133 dated 20/10/2008. The inter-ministerial character of the authority has been modified and
the new CMAA was mostly composed of CMAA technicians. The Prime Minister remains the Chair and Minister Prak
Sokhon becomes Vice-President instead of Minister Sok An
28
The removal was presented as a normal rotation of personnel. See 'Demining Head loses two posts in reshuffle',
Phnom Penh Post, 30/12/2008. However, it is believed that the reshuffle was rather linked to the sensitive border
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The UNDP projects 'Assistance to Mine Action in Cambodia' (2001-2005) and 'Clearing
for Results 2006-2010' (C4R) assisted CMAA to achieve a number of critical advances in
national planning, prioritisation and mine action regulation. An evaluation of the C4R
project in 2009 concluded that:
• the project had been pivotal in consolidating the institutional and operational
functioning of the CMAA
• considerable progress in the targeting and application of mine action assets and
with the systematisation of surveys and land release approaches had been made
• quality assurance and socio-economic impact improved
• CMAA possessed the fundamental political authority and technical competences
to manage its mandate more ably and maturely29
Recently, the CMAA successfully prepared the Cambodian MBT Article 5 Extension
Request and a ten-year extension has been granted to give Cambodia a new deadline
(December 2019), to comply with the treaty Article 5 obligation to clear all antipersonnel mines. To guide mine action operations during these ten years, Cambodia
developed a new Mine Action Strategy 2010-2019 (NMAS), which includes landmine
and ERW clearance, and MRE and victim assistance activities. The strategy was
developed under the leadership of the CMAA in a consultative and inclusive process
with all stakeholders.
It is estimated that, with the current level of support, and if operational productivity
continues to increase, the landmine and ERW threat will be reduced to a negligible level
in the next ten years30, and its impact on affected communities will be minimal. In the
long term, police and military capacity should be developed to address this residual
threat.
To demonstrate increased ownership in the sector, Cambodia and the CMAA organised
for the 11th Meeting of States Parties (MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty to take place in
Phnom Penh from 28 November to 2 December 201131. A side event was held as part of
the Phnom Penh MSP, to present the significant achievements of the mine action sector
in Cambodia in the previous fifteen years, including the solid policy and institutional

issues with Thailand. Visited in his office at the Council of Ministers, M. Sam Sotha declared that he had now new
responsibilities and had 'erased all his computers and brain hard disks concerning mine action', interview with Sam
Sotha, Phnom Penh, 31/8/2010
29
Powell B., Review of 'Clearing for Results', A partnership for Landmine Action in Cambodia, UNDP Cambodia (20062010), Final Draft, December 2009
30
The national mine action strategy indicates that, during the next ten years, Cambodia plans to release
approximately 470 km² of the estimated 648 km² of land considered contaminated by APM. Those figures do not take
into account the ATM and ERW contamination
31
See 'Achieving the aims of the Cartagena Action Plan: the Phnom Penh Progress Report 2010-2011', Draft as of 13
November 2011
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framework.32 The seminar also underlined the remaining challenges, including:
• the importance of improving government/donor coordination,
• a greater alignment between development partners and the RGC through
stronger emphasis and adherence to the partnership principles

32

'Addressing the landmine contamination on the framework of international obligations (Article 5) and Millennium
Development Goals (CMDG9)', Seminar Proceedings, 29/11/2011, Phnom Penh, Draft Minutes
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
POLICY DIALOGUE AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

Cambodia has long been synonymous with the issue of landmines, both in terms of
impact, and the energy and innovation of the government and the international
community in addressing the problem.
Mine action has always been highly positioned in the RGC agenda. The RGC actively
supported CMAC operations and strengthened its leadership over the sector with the
establishment of the CMAA in 2000. Cambodia has also been very active in the
international fora and structures against landmines. The RGC is committed to conclude
Cambodia’s mine action story as soon as possible and in a positive way, and has tried to
establish itself as a model for effective and sustained management of widespread
landmine contamination.
The policy dialogue with development partners used to take place during annual
consultative groups' meetings, but recently the RGC turned this process into the
Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF). The first CDCF meeting was held in
Phnom Penh in June 2007, with the government taking the lead and the ownership of
the process. The RGC has also developed a Government - Development Partner
Coordination Committee (GDCC) that supports the technical working groups under the
umbrella of the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board at the Council for
the Development of Cambodia (CRDB/CDC)33.
Today, the structure of the mine action sector is clearly defined34. The CMAA is
responsible for the coordination, monitoring and regulation of all mine action activities,
and for the formulation of strategies and plans to achieve the priorities identified by the
RGC development policies. The CMAA has now established a number of policies,
standards and guidelines for the management of the mine action programme, and as
such is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the national mine action
strategy.
Since 2004, a technical working group on mine action has brought the government and
development partners together to discuss policy issues, with the aim of improving
coordination, promoting alignment and harmonisation. Its mandate is to ensure the
government's leadership in coordinating all RGC, development partners and NGO
activities and resources, and to promote aid effectiveness according to the Cambodian
33
34

See Annex 7: The national aid effectiveness agenda in Cambodia
National Mine Action Strategy
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Declaration on Enhancing Aid Effectiveness and the Government Harmonisation,
Alignment and Results (HAR) action plan.
The application of the HAR action plan and of relevant joint monitoring indicators by all
stakeholders is crucial to the successful implementation of the mine action programme
and strategy. It requires that all development partners coordinate and align their
contributions and design their projects and programmes in support of sectorial strategic
goals and annual work plans. One of the most significant challenges to promote aid
effectiveness in the mine action sector relates to information management; all
implementing partners have to report the results of their activities to CMAA.
Information on external assistance should be made available via the Cambodian Official
Development Assistance database, and the CMAA.
The Cambodian mine action sector is moving towards a programme-based approach35,
as a way of managing the sector based on the principles of coordinated support.
Programme-based approaches share the following features:





leadership by the host country or organisation
a single comprehensive programme and budget framework
a formalised process for donor coordination and harmonisation of donor
procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement
efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and
implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation

The technical working group on mine action is currently finalising the review of new
partnership principles36 that were signed in April 2011, by the RGC and seven
development partners (Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, Ireland, UK and the UN),
to reinforce partnerships and collaborations between the RGC and development
partners in the mine action sector.
In December 2011, the CMAA organised a one day training by the Geneva based
'Gender and Mine Action Programme' (GMAP) and identified the main components of a
future 2012 gender action plan37. In October 2011, the CMAA organised a workshop on
gender and mine action to assess the progress and the needs. The UN gender guidelines
were circulated on this occasion.
35

See OECD Glossary: www.oecd.org/dac. The PAB is basically a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) that deals with a
thematic of a cross-cutting issue (as mine action or gender) rather than with traditional development 'sectors' as
education or health. Donors can support and implement programme-based approaches in many different ways and
across a range of aid modalities including budget support, sector budget support, project support, pooled
arrangements and trust funds. There are currently 19 TWG in Cambodia, including the technical working group on
mine action.
36
'Partnership Principles for the Implementation of the NMAS 2010-2019 as a single framework for mine action
related assistance', the document should be discussed during the next TWG-MA meeting.
37
Email from UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/2011.
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STRATEGIC AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS

Cambodia ratified the Mine Ban Treaty38 in July 1999, and it entered into force on 1
January 2000. In May 1999, Cambodia adopted a national legislation banning antipersonnel (AP) mines39, and started to produce its annual transparency reports
according to Article 7 of the MBT. Cambodia destroyed its stockpiles of AP mines before
the deadline of December 2004, in conformity with Article 4 of the convention.
Cambodia is also a state party to the Amended Protocol II on Landmines of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but not to the CCW Protocol V on
Explosive Remnants of War. Cambodia has also not yet signed the Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM).
Mine action is clearly articulated and prioritised in national development plans and
poverty-alleviation policies.
Consistent with the international aid effectiveness agenda, the National Strategic
Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010 reaffirms the RGC ownership and leadership of the
development process. The NSDP is the single, overarching document containing the
RGC's priority goals and strategies to reduce poverty and achieve the Cambodian
Millennium Development Goals (CMDG). The NSDP clearly underlines the humanitarian
and security significance of mine action and reaffirms the importance of mine clearance
for 'land distribution and the security of poor farming households in remote areas'. The
plan indicates that demining and risk education activities will be continued to reduce
the number of casualties40.
The NSDP has been formulated using the comprehensive 'rectangular strategy'41 of the
RGC. The strategy confirms that mine action will remain a government priority during
the new legislature that started in 2008. The strategy recognised that progress in mine
clearance was illustrated by a sharp drop in mine and ERW casualties; from 800 cases in
2003 to 315 cases in 2007. It also specified that mine action resulted in the expansion of
road networks and agricultural land; the strategy closely linked mine clearance to the
'principles of equitable distribution of cleared land to landless farmers'.
In 2003, the RGC adapted the eight universally agreed MDGs to better suit the realities
of the country. Recognising that one major constraint to development is the continued
38

'Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
their Destruction, 18 September 1997', also called the 'Ottawa Convention'.
39
'The Prohibition of the use of all Anti-Personnel Mine', Cambodian Law against Anti-Personnel Mines, adopted in
May 1999.
40
The National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2009-2013 has reset the target of the two indicators. The number
of annual mine/ERW victims should decrease by 10% every year; from the 2008 baseline (271 victims), the figure
should decrease to 243 in 2009, 212 in 2010, 191 in 2011, 172 in 2012 and 155 in 2013. The 2998 baseline total
cumulative cleared areas was 47,650 ha; annual figures should increase by 2% to 52,918ha in 2009, 58,292 ha in
2010, 63,772 ha in 2011, 69,363 ha in 2012 and 75,065 ha in 2013.
41
th
'Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency Phase II', First Cabinet Meeting of the 4
Legislature of the National Assembly, September 2008.
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contamination of landmines and ERW, the RGC added demining, UXO and victim
assistance to the list, to be the ninth major development goal.
ARTICLE 5 EXTENSION REQUEST AND NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY

Due to the high level of contamination, Cambodia requested and secured a ten-year
extension of the Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline42. It is believed that sustained
funding combined with maximising land release methodologies will assist Cambodia to
comply with its international obligations. According to latest estimations, around 650
km² could remain mine-affected and will need to be addressed in the future.
Based on the current productivity levels, Cambodia estimates that demining operations
undertaken during the next ten years by the three humanitarian operators combined
can achieve 470 km² and will require approximately USD 330 million of support. The
strategy to reach this objective is articulated in the national mine action strategy 20102019 successfully developed by the CMAA with all stakeholders and partners.
The NMAS has been developed for a ten-year period (2010-2019), covering the ten-year
Article 5 Extension request period, and two cycles of the NSDP (2009-2013 and 20142018). The strategy aims to reach a situation where Cambodia is 'free from the impact
of mines and ERW' and to ensure 'that women, men and children live safely and
development can take place in a safe environment'.
An essential component of the strategy begins with the implementation of a baseline
survey, to define the remaining contamination through a new land classification system.
The findings of this will complement the MAPU system and enhance planning and
prioritisation, to see clearance assets deployed where the greatest needs are43.
PLANNING CAPACITIES

Cambodia gradually developed one of the most efficient and sophisticated mine action
planning mechanisms in the world. While clearance operations primarily responded to
humanitarian and emergency imperatives in the first years of the programme, the
necessity to integrate socio-economic considerations in the planning system emerged
around 1996 and 1997.
CMAC started to acknowledge that it could not be responsible for the allocation of
demined land to beneficiaries, but must hand over safe land to local authorities. CMAC
concluded that it had to develop a stronger coordination with local authorities,
development agencies and other entities, before deciding which land had to be cleared
42
43

Article 5 Extension Request.
See in Annex 8: The main measures of the national mine action strategic plan.
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and for what purpose. It became gradually recognised that demining operators should
not decide alone which land is to be cleared. Demining is costly and time-consuming,
and guarantees should exist to ensure that cleared land is effectively used for
development purposes and by their intended beneficiaries44.
Such a move had even become more urgent when stories about land grabbing and
demined lands being confiscated by civilian or military officials started to emerge. CMAC
decided to address the problem during a two day workshop in Battambang in June
1998. During this meeting, military and police officers, provincial and local authorities,
UN agencies and development NGOs decided to develop together a new planning
system that would guarantee that cleared lands would be handed over to the intended
beneficiaries and would be protected from grabbing. The system was called land use
planning unit (LUPU)45.
With European Commission support, HI Belgium and Australian Volunteers International
(AVI) provided training and capacity development to the system that was gradually
enlarged to Bantey Meanchey46, Preah Vihear, Pailin and Oddar Meanchey.
An evaluation of the LUPU conducted in 2003 reported that the process was positively
evaluated by most of the senior PSC members who 'feel that it is clearly a government
structure that plays a useful role in preventing land disputes, in identifying suitable
beneficiaries to receive land and in bringing together demining operators and
development agencies'47. However, the LUPU system could not be considered as a quick
fix solution for all problems: by nature, LUPUs addressed large mine clearance tasks only
and could not be used as a planning tool for small tasks.
As the process takes several months, the system is also not ideal for emergency tasks.
Other systems had to be used to plan for those small and/or emergency tasks, such as
44

As seen in the previous chapter, the system arrived too late to protect CMAC from 'contract demining' and land
grabbing scandals. It is somehow bad luck for CMAC as the EC TA project addressing the problem should have started
in 1997 but was postponed to 1998 due to the July 2007 factional fighting. In addition, while the Battambang
workshop took place in June 1998, the system could only be set up in 1999 due to the July 1998 elections and the
subsequent establishment of a new government.
45
The system was first established in Battambang in 1999 and was designed to be transparent, participative,
decentralised and community-based. The process involves mine-affected villages, communes and districts authorities,
mine action operators and development agencies operating in the target areas. Through that mechanism, mine
action can effectively support commune and provincial development plans. The process aims at gradually developing
a list of demining tasks at commune and district level, in cooperation with all stakeholders, and having this workplan
officially endorsed at the provincial level. The objectives of the system were: to ensure effective, suitable and fair
land use, land management and allocation of land in mined areas, to ensure the demining process is clearly planned,
fair and transparent and engages the full participation of local authorities, to reduce land conflicts through effective
land management and well-planned demining agendas, to coordinate and facilitate all processes related to solving
land disputes.
46
The system in Bantey Meanchey had first been called 'Land Use Management Unit' (LUMU) and was slightly
different than in Battambang. The LUMU would later been aligned on the Battambang system.
47
Bolton M., Limpanboon P., Chhim V., Report of the external evaluation project "LUPU - Support to the planning of
demining and the utilisation of demined land in Cambodia", October 2003.
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the CMAC community-based mine risk reduction or the community mine marking
teams.
Another workshop organised in Battambang in December 2002 concluded that the
LUPU initiative virtually eliminated the theft of demined land48. This can be considered
as a remarkable outcome considering the immense difficulties that were encountered in
the past. In his closing speech, a government representative requested to:
• preserve and protect the system
• homogenise the operating procedures of the existing LUPUs
• find an institutional connection at the national level
Not everybody was convinced at that time that the LUPU system should have been
taken over by the CMAA. The setting up of the Ministry of Land Management, Urban
Planning and Construction (MLMUPC), with its indisputable responsibilities on the
national cadastre and the social concessions system (potentially including cleared
lands), could have been an opportunity to immediately try integrating mine action
planning in local and provincial development plans.
It is likely that such a move would have been audacious, but the MLMUPC was probably
not so keen to endorse such new responsibility at that time. Consequently, the CMAA
soon started working on the Sub-decree N°70/ANK/BK, officially adopted by the RGC in
October 2004. The CMAA issued guidelines on socio-economic management of mine
clearance operations in February 2005, and the guidelines were revised in November
200649. The policy guideline describes the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in
the socio-economic management process of mine clearance operations. The operational
guideline details all activities to be implemented during the planning process.
Basically, the new Sub-decree transforms the former LUPUs into mine action planning
units (MAPU) and the former PSC into provincial mine action committees (PMAC)50. This
mechanism is quite similar to the former LUPU system, and tries to build on it. The
MAPU conducts field investigations to:
• identify mined areas to be cleared
• monitor clearance activities and post clearance land use

48

'LUPUs stop demined land theft', Phnom Penh Post, 6/12/2002. It was also documented that LUPU teams
contributed to resolve land related disputes.
49
CMAA, Policy Guidelines and Operational Guidelines on Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance
Operations, November 2006.
50
Article 5 Extension Request. The Sub-Decree preserves the 'bottom-up planning process that allows local
communities to participate in the process of identifying suspect mined areas and to contribute to clearance
prioritisation leading to development of Provincial clearance plans'.
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The process starts with commune meetings where each village chief presents the village
'wish-list' of priority-clearance sites to the commune. Village chiefs, community-based
mine risk reduction (CBMRR), members of village development committee (VDC),
development agencies and commune chiefs participate in the commune meeting
facilitated by MAPU51.
Mine action district working groups (MADWG) are established by the provincial
governors in the districts where demining services are required. The composition of
MADWG includes members from district line offices and from stakeholders involved in
demining activities. Once minefield investigations of all proposed sites have been
completed, the results of the commune meetings and the minefield investigations are
presented during a district workshop, and each demining site is rated by the
participants using criteria developed by the PMAC in accordance to the operational
guidelines. Each minefield is categorised as 'high', 'medium' or 'low risk'.
Based upon the available number of demining assets, workshop participants determine
which sites come first for clearance, with high risk sites first on the list. Once the tasks
lists are finalised at the district level, they are presented to the PMAC for final approval.
The PMAC can add some of its own priorities to the final list. The MAPU then prepares a
list of all approved tasks with the location and name of the operator. It becomes the
responsibility of each operator to prepare its own plan for each site. Demining
operators’ annual clearance plans are then kept by the MAPU; completed minefields
and clearance progress are then forwarded to CMAA for inclusion in the database.
CMAA reports that the 'success of the prioritisation processes is clearly demonstrated in
the post-clearance land use monitored by the CMAA'52.
In 2007 and 2008, 61 per cent of clearance tasks targeted agriculture and resettlement,
while roads represented 28 per cent, and other purposes, such as schools, pagodas,
health centres, dykes and risk reduction purposes represented 11 per cent.
The mid-term evaluation of the project 'clearing for results' conducted in 200853
recognised that the MAPU process was conceptually sound, and that progress was
made in its implementation. The review team concluded that the CMAA should be more
involved in priority-setting and in the allocation of demining assets at the national level.
However, it also highlighted MAPU system’s lack of flexibility as an issue. For example,
once a plan was officially adopted, operators had to implement it, and were not allowed
to carry out area reduction or cancellation. As a result, demining units were not always
deployed according to high priorities.

51

Idem.
Article 5 Extension Request.
53
UNDP, midterm evaluation of the UNDP Project: 'Clearing for Results: A Partnership for Landmine Action in
Cambodia', Gomer L., Paterson T, Creighton M., November 2008.
52
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For this reason, the review team also made several suggestions to correct these
problems, including the adoption of an area reduction policy, which has in fact been
adopted. MAPUs are currently operational in eight provinces, and the RGC plans to
establish seven additional MAPU in the east and northeast of the country54.
DEMINING CAPACITIES

The Cambodian mine action sector achieved remarkable results from 1992 to 2009,
thanks to a combination of all operators’ demining activities, with efforts from all
stakeholders in the sector. In mid-2010, there was an estimated 5,000 staff employed
by the four demining operators (CMAC, RCAF, HALO and MAG).
The demining capacity of the three humanitarian civilian mine clearance operators was
consistently assessed and considered very positive during the last period of the
programme, and their performance on the ground was described as good and
improving55.
The increase of productivity of the demining operators in the last ten years has also
been impressive. The CMAA Database reported that a total of 595.5 km² was cleared by
the four demining operators between 1992 and July 201056. However, it must be noted
that although RCAF does report to CMAA, CMAA does not carry out quality
management. Since RCAF reporting does not follow usual systems (eg IMAS, IMSMA,
etc.), CMAA simply records the information provided, but does not check or review it,
making the quality of its reporting quite poor. In addition, RCAF reports their clearance
numbers without any map references. This means that more than 200 km2 of clearance
done by RCAF the CMAA database can only report in numbers not their locations.
These issues notwithstanding, the three humanitarian demining operators57 (CMAC,
MAG and HT) cleared altogether 385 km². The demining progress report for the three
organisations is as follow:
CMAC
M²

292.386.859

MAG
30.465.883

HT
62.090.924

TOTAL
384.943.666

54

CMAA has aligned the mine action planning system with subnational development and investment programmes,
especially the Commune Investment Programmes (CIP). New MAPU will be developed in seven new provinces in the
east of the country, to focus on BAC and ERW.
55
Paterson and Vanna, Capacity Development, 2004.
56
CMAA, Demining Progress Report (1992-July 2010), statistics extracted from operators demining progress reports
and updated as of August 9, 2010.
57
So far, only one RCAF demining platoon is accredited by the CMAA. The mandate and working methods of the RCAF
demining operations are not similar to those of the three other humanitarian demining operators.
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Since the beginning of the programme in 1992, a total of 884,000 anti-personnel mines
and more than 20,000 anti-vehicle mines have been found and destroyed, and nearly
two million UXO have been destroyed. Large amounts of suspected land has been
released for productive use, including:
• for the safe resettlement of thousands of refugees and internally displaced
people (IDP)
• to facilitate social and physical infrastructure reconstruction and other
development activities58
Productivity of demining operations has also strongly increased since the beginning of
the programme, as 132.5 km² was cleared by all operators between 1992 and 2000, and
a total of 462.8 km² was reported to have been cleared between 2001 and July 2010.
For the three humanitarian demining operators, the figure increased from 96.2 km²
(1992-2000) to 288.7 km² (2001-July 2010).
CMAC

Since its establishment, CMAC has grown into a large organisation which, by mid-1998,
employed nearly 3,000 staff. The current number of staff is 2,300, 95 per cent of whom
are deployed in the field. The four core functions of the organisation are MRE,
information, clearance and training. The largest component of the staff remains
employed in the demining platoons.
CMAC continues to innovate in introducing new demining tools and new approaches
and methodologies to increase the productivity of the organisation and deal efficiently
with the threat. The organisation demining toolbox includes, among others:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

demining platoons
mine detection dogs (MDD)
demining machines
brush cutters
EOD teams
battle area clearance (BAC) teams
technical survey teams
CBMRR teams

CMAC clearance capacity is mainly deployed to support humanitarian and development
priorities, as determined by the MAPU, and to respond to risk-reduction requests from
highly-affected communities59.
58
59

See Annex 4: Map of cleared areas in Cambodia.
CMAC, Integrated Work Plan 2010.

20

During the 18 years of operation, extensive capacities have been developed within the
organisation to allow CMAC take full ownership as a national demining organisation.
Since its inception, CMAC reports to have cleared more than 292 km² and destroyed
nearly 450,000 landmines and more than 1.5 million UXO.
THE HALO TRUST

HALO started working in Cambodia in 1991, when it was contracted by UNHCR to
undertake a rapid survey to facilitate the safe repatriation of Cambodian refugees from
Thailand. HALO began formal mine clearance operations in 1992 and has concentrated
on the northwest provinces. HALO’s objectives are to return land to poor communities
for farming and settlement and to reduce casualties caused by mines/UXO. The
organisation concentrated mainly on demining, and prides itself on the safety and the
efficiency of its clearance operations.
HALO introduced a number of innovations intended to boost productivity, such as the
'one man-one lane' (OMOL) drill for clearance. In 2003, the organisation developed a
dedicated EOD team and a MRE team. Following CMAC crisis, the organisation’s
operational capacity increased from 561 staff in 1999 to 900 in 2001. Its current
capacity is 1,161 national staff and four international staff60.
MINE ADVISORY GROUP (MAG)

MAG started working in Cambodia in 1992 and has carried out humanitarian mine
action operations in landmine- and ERW-affected communities since then, with a focus
on clearance, community liaison and MRE.
MAG has built partnerships with development organisations to systematically integrate
humanitarian mine action with development activities, especially in support of rural
development. MAG currently works in the provinces of Battambang, Bantey Meanchey,
Kampong Cham, Pailin and Stung Treng, with a capacity of approximately 250 national
and five international staff61. MAG’s strategic objective in Cambodia is to mitigate the
effects that remnants of conflict have on livelihoods, health, and economic and social
development, which will in turn promote poverty alleviation.
MAG has developed innovative approaches, with the introduction of both the
community liaison concept, which has been widely used. The organisation has also
promoted the hiring of women and amputees to work as deminers.

60

Vanna, Aid effectiveness, April 2010.
Since 2008, MAG reported a decrease of 30 to 40% of funding that has forced the organisation to reduce the
number of staff from 500 in 2009 to 250 today; interview with Jamie Franklin, Phnom Penh, 25/8/2010.
61
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THE ROYAL CAMBODIA ARMED FORCES

The RCAF engineering brigades have been involved in demining for many years. The RGC
has defined the roles of the RCAF in mine action as:
• urgent demining in support of government priority projects, and
• demining in support of UN Peacekeeping Operations62
RCAF demining capacity is about 1,300 personnel; they have received equipment and
training from China, France, Japan and the United States. RCAF is a national institution
with significant assets in the country, and is reported to have cleared 210.5 km²
between 1993 and July 2010. This represents more than 50 per cent of the three other
civilian operators’ achievements.
However, much of the reported clearance has been combined survey and clearance of
roads in support to rehabilitation projects. It was noted that higher productivity is
normal for such tasks, as most of the considered areas are actually not contaminated63.
Because of its specific mandate and command and control structure, RCAF does not
plan its work through CMAA and the MAPU system, and is not fully under the direction
of the CMAA. RCAF activities have not been subject to CMAA quality assurance, so some
other mine action organisations or development partners express concern that the
areas cleared by RCAF units may not be truly safe for civilian use. One RCAF demining
platoon was accredited in 2010; CMAA plans to accredit additional units in the future.
As indicated in the mine action strategy, the RGC foresees that RCAF may be an
important contributor in the long term solution to the residual contamination, once the
current programme structure with the civilian demining agencies will have disappeared.
It remains to be seen how the CMAA and RCAF will strengthen their operational
coordination and reporting system in the future.

OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) AND PRIVATE
COMPANIES

NGOs, such as Handicap International (HI) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have been
directly involved since the beginning of demining operations in the country. HI was used
in 1992 as an employment mechanism for deminers trained by the MCTU, before
handing those demining platoons over to CMAC.
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NPA started clearance projects in Battambang and Bantey Meanchey in support of the
Cambodian refugees’ repatriation operations carried out by UNHCR, and the
resettlement projects managed by the organisation. NPA handed this demining capacity
over to CMAC, and concentrated on providing technical assistance to CMAC.
The French organisation COFRAS/CIDEV developed demining activities in the Siem Reap
province, before their activities were integrated in CMAC DU6. Private companies also
entered the demining sector in Cambodia. Chirgwin Services Group was contracted with
Australian funds to clear land around an orphanage. UXB International was contracted
by the US State Department to monitor the US funded activities carried out by CMAC
DU3 in Pailin. Two local companies, MUA and Technical Assistance to Demining Service
(TADS) won contracts for survey and clearance services in support of road rehabilitation
projects funded by ADB.
It is also worthwhile mentioning that some development agencies integrated
development and clearance activities aimed at improving livelihood conditions for local
communities living in or near landmines/ERW contaminated areas64.
VILLAGE DEMINING

In Cambodia, access to safe land that is suitable for cultivation has been, and continues
to be, a widespread problem. Therefore, poor villagers developed what is called 'village
demining' activities. Mine clearance was undertaken by many people in Cambodia’s
rural areas, and the phenomenon was considered very significant but also very
controversial in the mine action community.
It was demonstrated that village mine clearance activities were usually 'rational
activities driven by livelihood needs'65. Village deminers recognise that what they do is a
dangerous activity but they also affirm that they do not have the choice, as landmines
block access to food and other essential resources.
Some mine action professionals have made proposals to make use of village deminers,
or to provide technical support or equipment to them. These proposals were generally
rejected because of concerns in term of safety, risk, responsibility and liability. It was
however widely recognised that the level of assistance provided by the sector remained
considerably low compared with the need.
It is not possible to precisely assess the village demining activities outputs. However,
information obtained from CMAC and reported by the 1999 Landmine Monitor Report
indicates that village deminers had cleared an estimated nearly 80 per cent of the
surfaces cleared by professional operators. Figures reported in 2000 were lower, at 45
64
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per cent, but indicate without any doubt that village mine clearance activities were
happening on a large scale throughout Cambodia, prior to and despite the arrival of
professional mine action organisations66.
SURVEY AND AREA REDUCTION POLICY

Several surveys were implemented and carried out by different organisations in
Cambodia, to try to identify suspect or confirmed contaminated areas. However, no
single consistent uniform set of procedures have been followed over time by the
different operators. As a result, data was collected in different ways, areas were
classified in different categories, and surveys were designed for different purposes. As a
result, the CMAA national database now contains six different types of survey reports67.
It is considered that some categories of these reports do not precisely describe the
current location and extent of Cambodia’s contamination; in particular the L1S reports
and this survey had been designed to measure the impact on affected communities
rather than accurately map mined areas. As a result, the national database operated by
CMAA in cooperation with NPA, CMAC, HT, MAG and CMVIS contains conflicting
information:
• overlapping areas
• conflicting classifications
• poor definition of area boundaries
Also, many areas that are effectively still contaminated have been missed. The lack of
uniformed procedures, and the problem caused by this situation on the operational
planning has been recognised by all operators and the government.
Because of the L1S limitations and the existence of conflicting information, the CMAA
and the three humanitarian demining operators decided to carry out a more focused
and detailed survey, to identify and define the exact extent of the remaining mined and
suspected areas.
The baseline survey started in August 2009 and was carried out by CMAC, HALO and
MAG in 122 districts. The operation began in the 21 most mine-affected districts that
represent 93 per cent of mine accidents that happened between 2004 and 2008, and
are considered to represent the most important priority for demining operators.
The information collected by the baseline survey is to supersede all previously-recorded
suspected hazardous areas; it will therefore provide a fresh and up-to-date picture of
the contamination. This is especially important because. This information belongs to
66
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CMAA and will be shared with MAPU, commune councils and village chiefs, and will
document future demining operations as regards planning and prioritisation. In fact,
only areas covered by the baseline survey will be accepted for survey and clearance
operations based on the MAPU prioritising and selection process, so MAPU will
gradually update the baseline survey information with completion tasks and released
land.
NATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Since 1992, mine clearance operators, guided by their own standard operating
procedures, have been using various clearance and survey methods to release suspect
mined areas. Before the CMAA was set up, there was no formal external quality
assurance being carried out on demining operators working in country.
After the creation of the CMAA in 2000, the development of national mine action
standards became a priority for the new regulatory agency; however, with limited
funding and support, the CMAA took a long time to develop a quality assurance
capacity. A MAG technical advisor had been deployed with the CMAA in 2002 and in
2003, to assist with the drafting of the standards based on the IMAS. With the support
of EC and UNDP, the technical advisor developed a first set of five standards by mid2003. Those standards were finally approved in August 2005 and issued in January
200668.
In 2006, UNDP contracted the private company BACTEC to act as a quality 'agent', to
assist CMAA in establishing a quality assurance department, monitoring teams and
accreditation procedures, as well as to assist with the development of Cambodian Mine
Action Standards (CMAS). BACTEC provided assistance to CMAA from 2006 to 2009, and
assisted in developing nine new standards. The approval procedure is long and rigid;
each standard takes approximately one year to be approved before being submitted to
the Prime Minister and issued through the promulgation of a formal decree. So far, 13
CMAS have been approved, with the most recent being the baseline survey and mine
and UXO hazard marking. There are still 11 draft standards waiting to be approved; they
are currently being reviewed by the operators before being translated to the Khmer
language.
With BACTEC support, the CMAA deployed its two first quality assurance teams in early
2008; there are now six quality assurance teams in operation. The responsibility of the
teams is to monitor compliance to CMAC by demining operators. The teams operate
form their provincial base and, at current capacity, this results in one quality assurance
monitoring visit per clearance site per month. Their capacity is probably overstretched,
given the geographic spread of operators, and it was recommended to increase their
68
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number to at least ten teams.
The MTE C4R reported that they had the opportunity to visit the provincial base, which
was considered very professional, with well-trained staff. The monitoring process was
reportedly diligent, and the understanding of safety requirements by the team was of
an acceptable standard.
CMAA does not provide quality assurance coverage to the mine action operations
implemented by RCAF. So far, only one RCAF platoon has been accredited by CMAA, and
it is believed that RCAF does not operate according to IMAS and CMAS. From January to
July 2010, the CMAA database reported substantial outputs cleared by RCAF (25 km²)
and none of these areas have been subject to quality assurance by the CMAA. Although
the CMAA has been given the mandate to monitor all mine action activities in the
country, the authority of the agency has not been exercised over the military.
MINE RISK EDUCATION (MRE)

Mine risk education (MRE) has been implemented in Cambodia since 1993, with the aim
of encouraging people to adopt mine/UXO risk avoidance behaviours, to prevent
landmines and UXO accidents. As Cambodia has progressed along the 'conflict – post
conflict – reconstruction and development' continuum, both the direct and indirect
causes for mine/ERW injury have changed69 and risk education techniques have been
adapted accordingly.
At the end of the nineties, a key priority for rural communities was access to land and,
as a result, 'informal' demining became widespread and a frequent cause of mine injury.
More recently, it was reported that informal demining and deliberate tampering, while
continuing in some areas, are more localised and less prevalent. While intentional
handling of UXO, especially among adolescent males, is still reported as an issue,
involuntary contact through routine livelihood activities is still one of the main reasons
for accidents. Indirect causes of accidents are increasingly recognised as a result of
livelihood issues, and there is a general consensus that lack of awareness is no longer a
major determinant of injuries.
Therefore, MRE developed its capacity to interact with mine-affected communities
through the provision of mine action responses, victim assistance and community
development programmes, as well disseminating mine risk education messages that
promote safe behaviour to populations at risk.
Since 2000, mine risk education is coordinated by the MRE unit of the CMAA, and
implemented through both government and non-government service providers. The
following organisations have been active in MRE since the start of the mine action
69
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programme:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

CMAC
the Cambodian Red Cross
CARE
HALO Trust
Handicap International Belgium
MAG
World Vision
Spirit of Soccer
National Police70
the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports

CRC has been active since the early eighties; UNICEF started to support MRE activities in
1994 and provided a total of USD 7,667,000 to the sector so far71. A mine risk education
strategic plan was developed in 2006 by the CMAA.
In 2010, MRE is fully integrated in the NMAS, and remains an important component of
the programme to reduce the incidence of casualties72.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Victim surveillance is part of the victim assistance component of the mine action sector
and represents a crucial source of information for planning purposes. The Cambodian
Mine/ERW victim information system (CMVIS) was developed by the Cambodian Red
Cross in 1994, with the support of Handicap International. CMVIS trained and deployed
a nationwide surveillance network of CRC volunteers to collect and report detailed
information related to mine casualties and mine/ERW incidents. The information is
subsequently disseminated to all stakeholders, and provides a rapid update of casualty
trends to facilitate the planning of clearance activities. CMVIS had been located and
operated at the CRC before to be handed over to CMAA at the end of 2009.
Government (80 per cent) and UNICEF (20 per cent) funding has been provided to
continue the activity.
The CMAA was initially mandated to coordinate and monitor assistance to landmines
and UXO victims in Cambodia. However, responsibility for victim assistance was then
delegated by sub-decree in 2001 to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth
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Rehabilitation (MoSVY) and the Disability Action Council (DAC), which was reaffirmed by
a second sub-decree in 200573.
MoSVY is the key ministry responsible for disability and rehabilitation issues in
Cambodia. Coordination of the sector is made through the National Disability
Coordination Committee (NDCC), which also encompasses landmines victims'
assistance. The NDCC is chaired by the Minister of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth
Rehabilitation and the DAC operates as the secretariat of the committee. The MoSVY is
responsible for disability issues in general, favouring a mainstreamed approach to victim
assistance that is coherent with the Cartagena Action Plan provisions related to victim
assistance74.
Because of its considerable number of mine victims, Cambodia is included in the VA26
group75. In November 2008, the RGC adopted the national plan of action for persons
with disabilities, including landmine/ERW survivors (NPA-PWD), which articulates the
RGC responses to the needs of all persons with disabilities . In July 2009, the national
assembly adopted the law on the protection and the promotion of the rights of persons
with disabilities. The law is said to be consistent with the dispositions of the convention
on the rights for people with disabilities76, which was signed by Cambodia in October
200777.
There are currently 11 rehabilitation centres providing orthopaedic, physiotherapy and
rehabilitation services to disabled people in Cambodia78. Those facilities are supported
by five international organisations:
•
•
•
•

ICRC,
HIB,
HIF,
Cambodia Trust, and

73

The Disability Action Council (DAC) was established in 1997 as a semi-autonomous national coordinating body for
the disability sector, with representatives from relevant government ministries, under the leadership of MoSVY, and
representatives from NGOs/agencies and individuals promoting the wellbeing of persons with disabilities. By subdecree, the DAC has recently become an official department of MoSVY
74
'Cartagena Mine Action Plan 2010-2014: Ending Suffering caused by Anti-Personnel Mines', December 2009
75
At the Mine Ban Treaty’s First Review Conference, 24 State Parties with the greatest number of survivors formed a
group and accepted that they had “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for
assistance” in providing victim assistance. They were later joined by Jordan and Iraq, which brought their number to
26.
76
The MBT was also a source of inspiration for the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) and its optional protocol, which marked a major step forward in promoting and protecting the rights of
people with disabilities and in ensuring their full and equal participation and inclusion in society. The CRPD can
contribute to the implementation of victim assistance by putting it in the context of a broader and more
comprehensive legal framework, aimed at protecting and promoting the rights of all people with disabilities.
77
In a clear reference to CRPD, Article 49 of the Cambodian law stipulates that international provisions will prevail in
case of contradiction.
78
In Kompong Speu, Phnom Penh, Kompong Chhnang, Sihanoukville, Siem Reap, Takeo, Kompong Cham,
Battambang, Kean Kleng (Phnom Penh), Prey Veng and Kratie.

28

• Veteran International (VI).
The eventual takeover of those rehabilitation facilities by the RGC remains a sensitive
issue for the MoSVY. The international organisations and the Ministry have signed an
agreement to arrange for the handover to take place at the end of 2010, however, it is
likely that the agreement will have to be extended79. The agreement plans for a gradual
increase of the government financial contribution to the structures, and for
transforming the local staff to government officers80. However, the sustainability of
some of those rehabilitation facilities is questioned as it is unlikely that the RGC will
have the capacity to maintain all the rehabilitation centres in operation.
The Landmine Survivor Assistance Program is funded by AusAID and managed by
Australian Red Cross (ARC). The program started in 2007 and was enlarged in 2010 to
become the Cambodia Initiative for Disability Inclusion (CIDI).
UNICEF has supported the development of the NPA, the law and the sub-decrees;
verification has ensured that national legislation is consistent with the UN CRPD. Since
2006, UNICEF has supported the national community-based rehabilitation (CBR)
coordination mechanism project to facilitate the development of CBR activities at
national level, and promote effective services provision and social welfare for people
with disability in the community.
While services for landmine/ERW survivors have been integrated into the NPA-PWD,
mine action stakeholders will continue to support MoSVY and the broader disability
assistance community to guarantee the provision of services tailored to the specific
needs of the survivors81 through:
• enhanced data collection,
• advocacy, and
• resource mobilisation efforts.
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE MINE ACTION
PROGRAMME
TYPE AND EXTENT OF SUPPORT
UNITED NATIONS

The mine action programme in Cambodia was initially mandated by the UNAMIC and
UNTAC, which trained Cambodian nationals to detect and destroy landmines, through
the setting up of training centres. Essentially, all the deminers who started operating in
the country in the beginning of the nineties had been trained during the UNTAC period.
When CMAC was established in 1992, a large part of the demining capacity was
gradually absorbed.
From the end of 1993, UNDP and UNOPS developed several phases of a project known
as 'Assistance to Demining Programmes'82. The objectives of this project were:


that donor’s financial contributions would cover CMAC operations, in line with
the official mandate of the organisation,
 to channel donor’s in-kind contributions of specialised military personnel to
provide technical assistance to CMAC, and
 to support institutional building in areas of leadership, planning, administration
and financial management, through UNDP technical advisors
For many donors, the UNDP Trust Fund (TF) has been the primary choice to channel
financial resources to CMAC for reasons of simplicity, transparency and accountability.
However, the use of the TF may have created a perception within CMAC that the
funding would be everlasting83. Between 1993 and 2000, it was reported that a total of
USD 63 million had been transferred to CMAC through the UNDP/UNOPS Trust Fund,
not including the government contribution of 1.76 million to CMAC and CMAA84.
From 2001 until 2005, UNDP implemented a Support to Mine Action Programmes in
Cambodia project, which aimed at:
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• continuing the provision of financial and technical support to CMAC and the
CMAA
• developing national ownership and decision-making
The project continued to channel pool funding to the sector and provide training
opportunities through the Mine Action Exchange programme and the senior mine
action management course, offered by the James Madison and Cranfield Universities.
Since 2006, UNDP has supported the Clearing for Results: A partnership for mine action
in Cambodia (C4R) project, with the aim of supporting the RGC’s response to its mine
problem by developing the CMAA capacity to lead, coordinate, monitor and regulate
the sector, and by funding clearance in support of poverty alleviation and rural
development activities.
Between 2006 and 2009, in partnership with CMAC, more than 30 km² were also
cleared. The project assisted CMAA to:
• revise the operational guidelines on the socio-economic management of mine
clearance operations
• establish a post-clearance land-use monitoring system
CMAA has developed its capacity in the regulation and monitoring of demining and
survey activities, by developing Cambodian Mine Action Standards and accreditation
mechanisms, and by deploying six quality assistance teams. Between 2006 and 2009,
Clearing for Results has mobilised some USD 25 million mainly from AusAID, CIDA,
Spain, Adopt a Minefield and UNDP core resources85.
Recently, Cambodian officials expressed the wish to develop to a more balanced
partnership with UNDP, to allow the CMAA to assume a more 'determinative role' in
managing the next phase of the C4R project (2011-2015)86. The direct implementation
modality was abandoned in favour of the national implementation modality.
Consequently, the chair of the TWG-MA is expected to play a more active role in the
management of the project and in the approval of the operational work plan.
The number of UNDP advisors should be reduced from two to one by the end of 201287.
The CMAA wishes to test the organisation's ability to manage key planning and
regulatory functions 'in its own right', believing that playing a stronger role in the
conduct of the project will reinforce the capacity of the agency to convene donors and
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national actors to push forward the aid-effectiveness agenda. The CMAA proposed to
have one single chair of the project executive group, 'ideally the CMAA'88.
As the sector is appropriately going into the direction of a programme-based approach,
this is a positive development, as the sector becomes more mature and the national
execution management modality is considered the norm by UNDP.
In compliance with its mandate in the mine action sector, UNICEF has been active in
providing technical and financial assistance to the mine risk education (MRE) sector.
UNICEF supported the coordination among the different operators and the
development of the community-based mine risk reduction project, and, recently,
funded the:
• MRE sector evaluation
• elaboration of the MRE strategy

Traditionally, UNICEF also supports the victim assistance component of mine action
programmes, for example:
• financial assistance to ensure the smooth handover of CMVIS from CRC to CMAA
• assistance to provide MoSVY to develop the disability law and issue the
application sub-decrees

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The European Commission (EC) has supported several operations in the mine action
sector in Cambodia through CMAC, and 'independent' operators, such as HALO Trust,
MAG, HIB and CIDEV. In February 1998, the EC launched the Institutional Strengthening
of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre project, which, through the provision of technical
advisors, aimed at:
• improving the coordination between CMAC and the other demining operators
• providing institutional support and capacity-building to CMAC in the EOD, socioeconomic and verification departments of the organisation
Within CMAC, one of the major outputs was the creation of a socio-economic unit that
was involved in the setting up of the LUPU prioritisation mechanism and the creation of
a regulatory body for the mine action sector (the Cambodian Demining Regulatory
Authority - CDRA) within CMAC Governing Council. The CDRA was set up to coordinate,
regulate and monitor mine action activities on behalf of the RGC. CDRA responsibilities
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were taken over by CMAA. From January 2002 until June 2003, the EC continued to
provide financial and technical assistance to assist the establishment of the CMAA.
The European Commission has also developed the Economic and Social Re-launch of
Northwest Provinces (ECOSORN). This five-year project ends at the end of 2010 and
includes a funding facility for mine action activities to be implemented in the target
zone by CMAC.
THE GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

The GICHD provides support to CMAC, the CMAA and other mine action actors in
Cambodia in the fields of strategic management, operations, and information
management. The minister attached to the Prime Minister and Vice-chair of CMAA, HE
Prak Sokhonn, is a member of the Council of Foundation and HE Heng Rattana, Director
General of CMAC, is a member of the advisory board. HE Sophakmonkol Prum, Deputy
Secretary General of CMAA, is a member of the International Mine Action Standards
Review Board.
The GICHD has assisted the CMAA to prepare the strategic planning process leading to
the adoption of the National Mine Action Strategy. The Centre also assisted the
midterm evaluation of the UNDP C4R project in 1998.
In the frame of 'Linking Mine Action and Development' (LMAD), GICHD and Cambodian
mine action and development agencies organised a workshop in Siem Reap in June
2007.
The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) has provided some assistance in relation to the
preparation of the Cambodian Article 5 Extension Request.
Over the last two years, the GICHD provided assistance to CMAC in:
• developing land release operational methodologies
• efficiently deploying mine detection dogs
• organising a mechanical demining workshop
The CMAA has also requested assistance to receive and install the new generation
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

A large number of Non-governmental Organisations have supported CMAC and the
mine action programme in Cambodia, through providing technical and financial
assistance.
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Handicap International

Contracted by UNDP, Handicap International (HI) provided several technical advisors to
CMAC headquarters and the three regional demining units in finance, administration
and logistics, contributing to the development of CMAC internal procedures. HI
supported the creation of the demining unit N°4 in Kompong Thom in 1996 with a grant
from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO).
The organisation has been directly involved in the establishment and the development
of the:
• LUPU system
• CMAC CBMRR approach
• setting up of CMVIS with CRC
HI has been very active in the disability sector, and was instrumental in developing and
supporting the physiotherapy school training curriculum in Phnom Penh. It has
managed several regional rehabilitation centres in cooperation with the Ministry of
Social Affairs and provided support to the Disability Action Council, to reinforce
coordination between MoSVY and the service providers active in the disability sector.
Norwegian People’s Aid

After having handed over the control of demining operations to CMAC in 1994,
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) continued to support CMAC, by providing technical
assistance and training in areas such as quality control, planning, demining unit
management, mine awareness, public relations and operations89.
To improve integration of clearance operations in development activities, NPA launched
the Resettlement, Community Integration and Rehabilitation project in 1996. NPA has
been innovative in supporting new approaches to increase the productivity and the
efficiency of CMAC, through contributing to the risk reduction concept and in
developing the technical survey model. NPA supported the setting up of a quality
management system (ISO 9000) and currently provides technical assistance to the
CMAA database. NPA was also instrumental in setting up a functional and working
CMAA database; all current staff are trained by NPA and NPA is fully funding the DBU’s
running costs.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

During the inception phase of the programme, technical assistance was provided in the
frame of UNTAC, and contributing countries seconded military advisors to the MCTU. It
is reported that, at one point, 130 military advisors were deployed, most of them
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rotated every six months; too short to be knowledgeable about Cambodia and its
culture90.
In addition, the short term of UNTAC mandate (18 months) did not facilitate
management training, resource mobilisation strategies, or the development of a
national programme. After UNDP set up the trust fund and started the Assistance to
Demining Programmes projects, an increased number of civilian technical advisors were
deployed in CMAC.
The UNDP Phase III project planned to have seven UNDP technical advisors and 61 other
positions provided by ten other donors and two UN agencies. In June 1999, a total of at
least 78 permanent international technical advisors were recorded as working for the
organisation91. It was estimated that the annual cost of the technical assistance
provided to the sector was between USD 7.5 million and USD 13 million, representing
sometimes the same amount of funding that had been channelled to CMAC operations.
Besides UNDP and UNOPS, major technical assistance providers included Canada,
Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, Finland, HI, NPA and Sweden.
The functional and cost-effectiveness analysis of this general capacity development
exercise for the period until 2000 remains mixed92:
 Technical assistance initiatives were mostly donor driven. Technical advisors
rotated to their government schedule, often for only six months at a time,
consulting with CMAC only minimally on proposed replacements or target
objectives of the exercise. Short term assignments did not facilitate their
eventual adaptation to the Cambodian culture and 'attitude' problems were
often reported, creating misunderstandings and frustration about the role of
technical assistance.
 Although the number of civilian technical advisors gradually increased, there was
a continued and persistent tradition of using military advisors with little
development background, who despite having high professional technical skills,
lacked somewhat in training and teaching skills. Incidentally, their presence
instilled a pervasive military culture in the organisation, preventing CMAC from
linking effectively with civil society, development organisations or other
ministries. In fact, several attempts were made by TA’s to have CMAC change
focus but the CMAC top management insisted on having it this way. This
insistence on drill and technical training may have been detrimental to the
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strengthening of other equally essential management functions such as finance,
human resources and planning.
 The initial and traditional capacity-development delivery method was done in a
one to one way, with one advisor dedicated to one national counterpart. The
system was considered by CMAC management as inefficient to create a
sustainable capacity-development environment. Using a roving or horizontal
approach would have reached a wider audience and maximised the impact of
the intervention. As a result of this system, technical advisors often became
directly involved in operational issues instead of supporting national
counterparts. In some other cases, they were even asked to do the job instead of
being seen as advisors.
 The proliferation of international advisors seconded by a large number of donors
and organisations, with sometimes vague or non-adapted terms of reference,
did not facilitate the coordination of the different inputs by CMAC and the UNDP
coordinator. There was a lack of continuity and coherence between successive
technical advisors. Furthermore, they had also developed a large set of manuals
and procedures in English that could not be shared with their national colleagues
or with middle management. As a result, many could not contribute to the
strengthening of the institution.
The crisis that hit CMAC in 1999 and 2000 forced a change of perspective in capacity
development delivery methods. The large international technical advisor contingent had
been seen by CMAC management as unable to prevent the crisis and ineffective to take
corrective measures. On the contrary, the solution seemed to originate in an increased
national leadership of the programme and, as a result, the necessity to own and control
the process of designing, selecting, managing and monitoring all technical assistance
appeared more evident to CMAC.
In the preparation of the next phase of the project, the number of foreign technical
advisors was significantly phased down, and their professional skills were more carefully
scrutinised. The new project gave the CMAC Director General the capacity to make
decisions at all stages in regard to the need to initiate or continue capacity development
inputs, including the preparation of terms of reference, monitoring of the progress and
coordination of the inputs from the various partners. The old technical advisors
structure was abandoned and it was suggested to adopt a more flexible, efficient and
streamlined mechanism that would mix the presence of long term civilian expert
advisors with other professional development solutions. Examples of this included:
• study tours
• workshops
• seminars
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• courses
• training
• short consultancies
It was decided to reinforce the use of existing national services and capacities:
consultant companies were contracted to provide management advisory services to
CMAC, focusing on internal controls and human resources development. Training needs
assessments were carried out, and a staff training and development programme was
developed and implemented as part of the integrated working plan.
The crisis created an electroshock for the RGC, CMAC and the donors. The reputation of
the organisation was in jeopardy and the donor confidence at the lowest. A large
number of management staff was demoted, resigned or moved to other services. To
ensure its survival, the organisation had to reform radically, and the CMAC management
took control of this process. The crisis facilitated the understanding that the on-going
technical assistance system had reached its limits and had to be seriously re-examined.
The principle of national execution was reemphasised, and CMAC ownership of its
technical assistance re-established. The crisis prompted the RGC to get more involved
with CMAC and to reorganise the institutional framework of the mine action sector in
Cambodia, by creating the CMAA and reviewing CMAC mandate, freeing it to
concentrate on its core functions.
In parallel, issues related to national ownership and leadership of the development
agenda and process were highlighted in new cooperation paradigm that was presented
by the RGC to development partners during the Consultative Group meeting in May
2000. This new thinking – with the increased importance of the national aid
effectiveness agenda – would now substantially influence the way the mine action
sector would be managed and the programme operated. As indicated in the mine action
strategy, the creation of the CMAA was the product of the new mindset among
Cambodian leaders, and the national regulating agency was seen as symbol of an
increased national ownership and leadership of the mine action sector93.
The EC94 and the UNDP supported the first steps of the CMAA establishment. The first
years of operations were complicated, partly due to a lack of confidence by donors and,
consequently, little external assistance had been channelled to the CMAA.
Gradually, more technical and financial assistance was provided to the database by
Germany and Canada. United Kingdom assistance was channelled through UNDP, to
93

'The CMAA was established to provide holistic national leadership to the sector and to symbolize Cambodia
ownership of the problem that had up until then been largely managed by the international community', Article 5
Extension Request.
94
The EC capacity development project had to last three years with a budget of EUR 1 million but the duration of the
project was later reduced to 18 months as 40% of that budget had been allocated to HI to develop and reinforce the
LUPU system.
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develop socio-economic planning and quality management. In the C4R project, more
substantive support was provided to CMAA to develop management capacities,
consolidate the authority of the agency and strengthen mine action policies and
standards and enhance the prioritisation and planning system. The UNDP capacity
development team is composed of a project coordinator, a technical advisor in socioeconomics and a technical advisor in quality management95. In the C4R phase two, the
number of advisors should be reduced to two and then one by 2012. The CMAA
capacity development plan was finalised in August 201196.
Despite some above mentioned limitations, the long effort of developing capacity of the
Cambodian mine action sector definitely brought positive results.
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Cambodia has benefited greatly from significant contributions from the international
community to fund mine action activities since 1992. The overwhelming majority of
mine action funding has been directed to mine clearance, but significant contributions
have also been made to MRE, victim assistance, mine action governance, integrated
mine action programmes and research and development. While Cambodia remains a
developing country with great pressure on its national budget to address a wide range
of different needs, the RGC, in recent years, managed to increase its budget allocation
to mine action.
Development Partners contributed to all the components of the mine action
programme, plus in-kind donations such as metal detectors, vehicles, information
technology (IT) equipment, mine detection dogs (MDD) and demining machines. Total
documented contributions are USD 267,836,89597 for the period 1993-2009. The three
operators (CMAC, HALO Trust and MAG) received financial contributions from donors of
at least USD 244,393,63598 from 1993-2009.
The RGC provided USD 2,945,136 support to CMAC from 1994 to 2009 and USD
8,902,976 in core support for CMAA, RCAF and the police, from 2003 to 2009. In
addition, the MoEF, over the period 2000-2007, provided over USD 38,541,865 to
finance demining support for infrastructure reconstruction projects, giving a total
estimated RGC contribution of approximately USD 50 million from 1994 to 200999.
Other Cambodian contributions, particularly by local authorities and community
95

Powell, B., Review of Clearing for Results a Landmine Partnership, December 2009.
Email from the UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/11.
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Vanna M., Aid Effectiveness, April 2010. Remark, the author could only document contributions from Australia,
USA, Canada, Germany, Netherland and Japan during the study.
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CMAC : USD 168,956,685; HALO Trust : USD 52,495,815; MAG : USD 22,941,135.
99
Vanna M. Aid Effectiveness, April 2010. The UNDP also reported that the RGC provided a contribution of
approximately USD 3.3 million in 2009 and USD 2.27 million in 2010 to the CMAA, CMAC, NPMEC, Police and Border
Committee. An even more contribution is provided by the RCAF in demining operations conducted to support
infrastructure construction. (Email from UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/11).
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members, gave valuable contributions to the successful execution of the mine action
programme over the last 18 years.
EXISTENCE AND CONTENT OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PLANS

After 17 years of operations and the provision of massive capacity development and
technical assistance for more than ten years, CMAC is happy to declare that the
organisation does not need substantial capacity development anymore100. CMAC
currently benefits from assistance from JICA, which deployed three experts in
information management, maintenance of equipment and capacity development of the
training centre; NPA, which provided an MDD TA; and Germany, which funded a TA with
DU6. This phase of the project will stop in September 2010. The continuation of this
activity will depend on an eventual new request for assistance from CMAC.
Regarding CMAA, the assessment is different. The C4R Review (December 2009) noted
that CMAA was still in need of capacity development and institutional strengthening.
The CMAA is currently in the process of assessing its future capacity development
needs. The C4R review reported that the provision of technical assistance via
embedded and dedicated personnel – whether full time technical advisors or long term
specialist consultants – was the best indicated modality for supporting capacity
development within the agency. The review recommended continuing with this
modality during the next phase of the project (2011-2015).
The CMAA and UNDP are in the process of assessing the future needs of capacity
development in the organisation101. Without pre-empting the results of this exercise,
the C4R review proposed nevertheless the following recommendations related to
capacity development:
 the CMAA database is currently supported by NPA; it is recommended to
reinforce that assistance to enhance the capacity of the database to provide
comprehensive information services to the government, development partners
and mine action organisations
 the CMAA quality assurance teams performances should be evaluated to assess
future capacity needs,
 the CMAA socio-economic and planning department should be reinforced
through the provision of long term consultants
 South-south cooperation should be further developed
Although it is accurate to declare that the mine and ERW problem will continue for a

100
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Interview of Heng Rattana, Phnom Penh, 27/8/10.
A CMAA capacity development plan and strategy has been finalised in August 2011.
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long time in Cambodia102, it is considered that a large part of this problem – the part
that actually affects people's life – can in fact be resolved in a reasonable period of time.
With appropriate support, it is believed that the National Mine Action Strategy
constitutes a realistic and credible road map toward a situation where the landmine and
ERW contamination will have a gradually negligible negative impact on Cambodian
citizens. According to the strategy, Cambodia aims to be mine/ERW impact free within
the next ten years (2019). In order to address the longer term requirements in solving
the mine and ERW contamination problem, the RGC will engage key national players
(CMAC, RCAF and Police) to ensure that viable and sustainable institutions are in place
after 2019.
Taking into account the strategic objectives, the remaining capacity development efforts
to be implemented in the Cambodian mine action sector should be appreciated from
this medium term perspective. All mine action professionals believed that most of the
problem should be solved by 2019 if the programme is correctly funded and well
managed. However, the current priority should be to assist Cambodia to sustain
ongoing efforts during the next ten years, at a level that will allow the accomplishment
of the national mine action strategy objectives.
With the national ownership and leadership of the programme now well affirmed,
development partners should remain confident it is possible to achieve concrete and
substantive results in the next ten years for the following reasons:
 While it had often been said that mine action in Cambodia would last several
hundred years, we have now to recognise that the threat is much more
manageable than initially thought, and can be quickly reduced to an acceptable
level. Unlike other development problems, the clearance of mine/ERW affected
areas solves the problem: it will not come back again.
 The Cambodian mine action programme has undoubtedly been through some
challenging periods. The current institutional and operational conditions are
however considered to be favourable for the future. It is important that they
receive the encouragement an support they need.
 Mine action remains essential for development and poverty reduction; mine
action is an investment, not a cost, it creates economic opportunity and reduces
health and security cost.
 Support to mine action is a moral imperative towards poverty-stricken
Cambodians living in affected areas.
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This is true for all countries that had protracted conflicts on their territory. Every year, Belgium, UK, France and
The Netherlands still find and destroy potentially deadly unexploded ordnances dating from WWI and WWII.
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
TRANSITION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Today, the structure of the mine action programme is clearly defined and it is
reasonable to assert that national ownership by Cambodian authorities of the mine
action programme is now firmly established because of and thanks to the following:
 the presence of a large, efficient and competent national mine action
organisation as CMAC
 the establishment of the CMAA, acting as a regulator on behalf of the
government, and coordinating the assistance made by all partners involved in
the programme, especially the essential contributions made by CMAC, HALO and
MAG to demining activities
 the setting up of the TWG-MA facilitating policy dialogue, and partnerships
between the RGC and development partners103
However, this does not mean that there is no room for improvement; in terms of
progressing towards a programme-based approach and reinforcing aid effectiveness in
the sector, the following issues have been identified104:
 There are still a number of projects supported by different development
partners which are independently managed and implemented. These include
projects on MRE, demining, and integrated demining and development projects.
Demining activities funded by the RGC in support of infrastructure projects are
not recorded for the mine action sector in the ODA database105.
 Some mine action operators do not have complete records of the funding they
received. Some development partners do not have complete records of their
mine action contributions. The mine action sector does not have a mechanism to
record financial and in-kind contributions, and the CMAA Secretariat General
does not have a clear mechanism to confirm financial contributions from the
MoEF for demining activities.
The formulation of the NMAS has been a constructive process and the strategy is in
itself an important asset for enhancing national ownership and the aid effectiveness
agenda. However, some gaps remain:


The absence of complete and accurate records on the extent and nature of
the contamination still hampers operational planning and prioritisation.
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This feeling was shared by most of the people interviewed during the study.
Vanna M., Aid effectiveness, April 2010
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According to UNDP, there is also little consultation between the CMAA (representing the Cambodian Government)
and development partners on programmes and projects planning. This constitutes a difficulty for the CMAA to ensure
assistance and support national strategic priorities.
104
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Missing information should be made available by the end of 2012, with the
completion of the baseline survey.
Complete and accurate records of RCAF demining achievements are still not
available106.
The database unit in CMAA needs continued reinforcement, if the data are to
be analysed and reported in a timely and useful way.
The coordination with a number of government agencies and ministries
facing mine/UXO contamination problems could be improved. CMAA can
provide assistance but lacks a coordination capacity with relevant
government bodies (for example, ministries in charge of infrastructure,
agriculture and rural development)107.
Reporting at the output level is reasonably accurate, but little reporting
exists at the outcomes level. CMAA still has to develop its monitoring and
evaluation system. Some initiatives (such as the UNDP supported Impact
Assessment methodology development) are underway to strengthen this
function.

The TWG-MA will play a crucial role if the goals and strategic objectives of the NMAS are
to be achieved. In particular, the TWG-MA should focus on policy dialogue and
partnerships expansion with mine action development partners, as there is no other
mechanism to fulfil this role.
NMAS, together with Partnership Principles, the Planning and Prioritisation Guidelines
and the Cambodian Mine Action Standards provide a good policy and regulatory
framework for the mine action sector, but other sectors are unaware of these policies.
Coordination with ministries and other government agencies can be further developed.
Mainstreaming mine action within government rehabilitation and socio-economic
development plans and strategies remains as critical as ever.
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According to CMAA, RCAF/NPMEC will use the BLS data and provide completion site sketches to the CMAA
Database. The old RCAF data cannot be backtracked but they have some clearance polygons to verify.
107
On this issue, the composition of the 'first' CMAA looked more appropriate.
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LESSONS LEARNT
THE ROLE OF THE UN

The United Nations (UNTAC, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS) have been pivotal in
creating the impetus establishing a mine action capacity in Cambodia. Despite the initial
lack of vision and preparation often underlined in the documentation and the strong
military and organisational mindset, most people questioned during this research
expressed the feeling that the UN, alongside other organisations as HI and NPA, should
be 'proud' of what had been done in building national capacities to operate and manage
a large, complex and comprehensive mine action programme.
THE USE OF THE TRUST FUND

The use of a pool funding facility as the UNDP Trust Fund is recognised to decrease
transaction costs and is appreciated by donors for its transparency and simplicity. The
application of such a modality is to be encouraged, as the sector is more actively moving
into a programme-based approach108. However, at the beginning of the programme, the
trust fund may have generated a diffuse feeling among CMAC staff that it was a neverending source of cash with the negative consequence that efficiency and productivity
were not given enough attention109. For various reasons, some donors prefer to
earmark and channel directly their contributions to mine action operators. To ensure
the requirements of the various donors are accommodated and in order to enlarge the
partnerships possibilities, CMAC and other organisations have usefully developed their
management and reporting capacities.
THE CRISIS AND CMAC REFORM

The 1999-2000 crisis undoubtedly constituted an electric shock treatment for the RGC,
CMAC and the donors. To regain confidence from donors, CMAC had to engage in a very
structured and robust reform process that enhanced its operational capacity and
productivity and significantly improved the quality of its management. The crisis
prompted the RGC to restructure the institutional framework of the mine action sector
in Cambodia, by creating the CMAA and reviewing CMAC mandate, allowing to
organisation to concentrate on its core functions.
THE CRISIS AND THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The crisis facilitated the understanding that the existing technical assistance system had
reached its limits and had to be seriously re-examined. The way capacity development
and technical assistance were provided to CMAC and the mine action sector was
108

A PBA does not imply a single funding mechanism.
'The focus to date for CMAC has been on safety, effectiveness and, to some degree, efficiency. From observation,
efficiency does not appear to have been given sufficient attention. There has been an inability to analyze the basic
data and this highlights the lack of attention to productivity'. Dalton et al 2001. According to UNDP, a way to avoid
this is to allocate resources to projects through a competitive process. This should promote transparency, costefficiency and results-based management of the resources allocated to the sector.
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radically modified. The old technical advisor structure was eliminated and there was a
shift from military to civilian technical advisors with development experience. This
encouraged Cambodian ownership, the principle of national execution was
reemphasised, and CMAC ownership of its technical assistance re-established. Capacity
development has been at the heart of the efforts made by the organisation during the
post-crisis period and, thanks to those efforts, CMAC can now be described as a
stronger, more efficient and better managed mine action organisation.
THE CMAA

Despite being consistent with best internationally recognised practices, the creation of
the CMAA as a national agency responsible for regulating and coordinating mine action
in Cambodia was not fully understood in 2000. It is now accepted that separating the
regulator – acting on behalf of the government – and service providers is a sound, valid
and necessary move. The establishment of this agency consolidated the national
ownership in giving the RGC the capacity to lead the programme according to its
priorities and strategies. There is still room for improvement in the way the agency
operates, but progress has been observed. An efficient CMAA will be an asset to achieve
the goals and objectives articulated in the national mine action strategy.
THE PBA

The adoption of a programme-based approach (PBA) by the Cambodian mine action
sector has given an unquestionable leadership position to the RGC in leading the
programme, and is considered crucial in guaranteeing the continued enhancement of
operational efficiency in the sector. The application of the Harmonisation, Alignment
and Results Action Plan and the relevant joint monitoring indicators by all stakeholders
is essential to the successful implementation of the NMAS. The TWG-MA ensures policy
dialogue, encourages the development of new partnerships, and harmonises activities
and projects to avoid redundancy and resources duplication.
TOWARDS THE END OF THE PROGRAMME

Although not always smooth and easy, the long capacity development exercise has been
considered fruitful and decisive in the progresses made by the mine action programme
in this country. However, in regards to demining objectives and plans, massive clearance
operations are not sustainable. Consideration should be given by development partners
to channel an appropriate level of financial and technical resources to ensure that
Cambodia complies with international obligations related to landmines to achieve the
goals and objectives articulated in the national strategy. To reach such a situation,
Cambodia must preserve robust clearance capacity and services among its professional
operators, and ensure the strengthening of its prioritisation (MAPA) and quality
assurance mechanisms. The long term residual landmines and ERW contamination will
be addressed by national operators as RCAF and the police with national resources.
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VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Progress has been observed in the development the National Plan of Action for People
with Disabilities (NPA-PWD), the adoption of the law protecting PWD and some of the
relevant subdecrees. Cambodia is actively preparing to ratify the UN Convention on the
rights of PWD. However, observers underlined the lack of support to the MoSVY in the
implementation of those measures and plans; it was also noted that the handover of
the 11 rehabilitation facilities currently operated with the assistance of five
international NGOs was threatened by a lack of funding from the RGC.
ADVOCACY

In support to peace and security efforts worldwide and in the region, the national mine
action strategy indicates that the RGC will join as soon possible other disarmament
instruments, such as the CCW Protocol V related to ERW. In the 'Rectangular Strategy'
and the NMAS, Cambodia confirms its willingness to contribute positively to regional
integration, peace and security. Cambodia reaffirmed its readiness to closely cooperate
with its neighbours, in order to engage as soon as possible in the demarcation and
clearance of the border area. As Cambodia is one of the most UXO-affected countries in
the world, some development partners recommended Cambodia to sign the Convention
on Cluster Munition (CCM), as this may open new resources opportunities for the
programme.
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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

Cambodia Political Map
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ANNEX 2

Location of the Main Anti-PKR Camps
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ANNEX 3

Cambodia Key Indicators
World view
Population, total (millions)
Population growth (annual %)
Surface area (sq. km) (thousands)
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions)
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)
GNI, PPP (current international $) (billions)
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)
People
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)
Environment
Forest area (sq. km) (thousands)
Agricultural land (% of land area)
Improved water source (% of population with access)
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)
Economy
GDP (current US$) (billions)
GDP growth (annual %)
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)
Industry, value added (% of GDP)
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP)
States and markets
Time required to start a business (days)
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP)
Military expenditure (% of GDP)
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
Internet users (per 100 people)
Roads, paved (% of total roads)
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)
Global links
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (millions)
Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) (millions)

2000

2005

2007

2008

12,76
2,0
181,0
..
3,62
280
11,03
860

13,87
1,6
181,0
..
6,20
450
19,35
1.400

14,32
1,6
181,0
30,1
8,01
560
24,98
1.740

14,56
1,6
181,0
..
9,25
640
27,18
1.870

57
3,9
24
32
106
40
65
47
82
1,6

59
3,1
40
44
96
..
79
85
..
1,0

60
3,0
..
..
91
..
79
85
90
0,8

61
2,9
..
..
90
29
89
79
..
..

115,4
27,0
38
16

104,5
30,3
..
..

100,1
30,9
..
..

..
..
..
..

3,65
8,8
-3,2
38
23
39
50
62
18
..
..

6,29
13,3
6,1
32
26
41
64
73
18
9,7
0,0

8,63
10,2
6,5
32
27
41
65
73
21
..
..

10,35
6,7
12,3
35
24
41
..
..
..
..
..

..
..
2,2
1
0,0
..
0

86
..
1,1
8
0,3
..
..

86
..
1,1
18
0,5
..
..

85
..
..
29
0,5
..
..

149
396

381
539

867
675

815
743
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ANNEX 4

Timeline of the Programme
November 1991

UNAMIC deployment

1991-1992

HALO survey in Battambang province

March 1992

UNTAC deployment

June 1992

Official creation of CMAC by SNC

July 1992

Setting up of the MCTU

November 1992

First meeting of CMAC Governing Council

1993
deminers

HIB employs the first MCTU graduates and fields the first
Deployment of NPA, HALO, MAG and COFRAS

May 1993

National elections
First FUNCINPEC / CPP coalition government

September 1993

Sihanouk returned as new King

December 1993

UNTAC withdrawal
First UNDP / UNOPS Assistance to Demining Programme

February 1995

A Royal Decree established CMAC as a public institution
Appointment of a new CMAC Director, first CMAC strategic plan

August 1996

First KR defections (Ieng Sary faction)

July 1997

'Factional fighting' in Phnom Penh
Some FUNCINPEC commanders join the KR along the border with

Thailand
April 1998

Death of Pol Pot

July 1998
government

National elections – Second CPP / FUNCINPEC coalition
Cambodia regains its seat at the UN General Assembly
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December 1998

Final KR defections

Beginning 1999

First corruption and 'contract demining' allegations

May 1999

KPMG appointed to audit CMAC

August 1999

Sam Sotha is removed from the CMAC Director position

1999

Cambodia is accepted as a member of ASEAN

Mid-2000

Start of the Level 1 Survey

September 2000

Creation of the CMAA

November 2000

National Symposium on mine action

2001

Start of the UNDP Assistance to Mine Action project

February 2002

First commune councils elections

April 2002

Termination of Level 1 Survey

August 2003

CMAA National Mine Action Strategy / Five-Year Mine action Plan

November 2004

Creation of the TWG on mine action

2006

Beginning of UNDP C4R phase 1 project

October 2008

Revision of CMAA Royal Decree

November 2009
obligations

MBT SP grant a 10 years extension to comply with Article 5

2010

Adoption of a new 2010-2019 National Mine Action Strategy
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